Once more we can see that Army officials acknowledged that DU is toxic forever and that specific remediation procedures are required to clean up DU contamination. I then developed and verified these procedures while the DU Project Director.
Consequently, in response to the GAO report, initial reports submitted by AEPI scientists, and my/our efforts the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order that was consequently reissued on August 14, 1993 and signed by General Eric Shinseki that DOD shall:
"1. Provide adequate training for personnel who may come in contact with depleted uranium equipment.
2. Complete medical testing of personnel exposed to DU contamination during the Persian Gulf War.
3. Develop a plan for DU contaminated equipment recovery during future operations."
The criteria describing unusual DU exposures requiring medical screening within 24 hours of exposure and consequent medical care were specified in a message from Headquarters Department of the Army dated October 14, 1993. These exposures included:
"a. Being in the midst of smoke from DU fires resulting from the burning of vehicles uploaded with DU munitions or depots in which DU munitions are being stored.
b. Working within environments containing DU dust or residues from DU fires.
c. Being within a structure or vehicle while it is struck by DU munitions."
Consequently, in response to the GAO report, initial reports submitted by AEPI scientists, and my/our efforts the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order that was consequently reissued on August 14, 1993 and signed by General Eric Shinseki that DOD shall:
"1. Provide adequate training for personnel who may come in contact with depleted uranium equipment.
2. Complete medical testing of personnel exposed to DU contamination during the Persian Gulf War.
3. Develop a plan for DU contaminated equipment recovery during future operations."
The criteria describing unusual DU exposures requiring medical screening within 24 hours of exposure and consequent medical care were specified in a message from Headquarters Department of the Army dated October 14, 1993. These exposures included:
"a. Being in the midst of smoke from DU fires resulting from the burning of vehicles uploaded with DU munitions or depots in which DU munitions are being stored.
b. Working within environments containing DU dust or residues from DU fires.
c. Being within a structure or vehicle while it is struck by DU munitions."