The trans-Atlantic battle over Turkey came to a head at this month's E.U. summit in Copenhagen. Buoyed by Erdogan's flashy visit to Washington, Turkish representatives at the Copenhagen summit threatened to boycott European products, or even dump the E.U. and join NAFTA, if they did not receive their preferred date for membership talks. Meanwhile, high-profile U.S. pressure on the E.U. to create a special fast-track for Turkey may have scored PR points with Ankara, but cut little ice with E.U. members. European External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten, for example, laughed off the Bush administration move as a cheap stunt, akin to E.U. members trying to score Latin American bonus points by pressuring the U.S. to make Mexico its 51st state. The upshot was that Erdogan's attempt to play the States against Europe backfired: Turkey received a 2005 date for conditional membership talks even though it had pushed for one far earlier, and even worse, while the Greek part of Cyprus was asked to join the E.U., the Turkish part got left behind.

The crucial question now is what path Turkey chooses to take. Erdogan can gain personal status and billions in monetary injections for the Turkish military and government by allowing the U.S. full access to Turkish soil in its attack on Iraq; the danger is that he could anger both the Turkish people and the E.U. in the process, not to mention see Turkey flooded with refugees, as happened during the first Gulf War.