At approximately the same time that this report was being prepared, the United States Army's Environmental Policy Institute, AEPI, was tasked (December 13, 1992) by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational health to determine (quote):
1. The health and environmental consequences of using DU on the battlefield.
2. Which remediation technologies exist or might be developed to clean up DU contamination.
3. Ways to reduce DU toxicity.
4. How to best protect the environment from the long-term consequences of DU use.
Therefore it was and still is obvious that United States military leaders knew that using DU would cause health and environmental problems. I was asked to help conduct the research and prepare the recommendations and final AEPI report because I was the Army health physicist who helped clean up the DU mess following Desert Storm and was working for the Army preparing environmental compliance procedures. The findings issued in 1995 (Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the Army: Technical Report, U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute, June 1995) were quote:
1. The health and environmental consequences of using DU on the battlefield.
2. Which remediation technologies exist or might be developed to clean up DU contamination.
3. Ways to reduce DU toxicity.
4. How to best protect the environment from the long-term consequences of DU use.
Therefore it was and still is obvious that United States military leaders knew that using DU would cause health and environmental problems. I was asked to help conduct the research and prepare the recommendations and final AEPI report because I was the Army health physicist who helped clean up the DU mess following Desert Storm and was working for the Army preparing environmental compliance procedures. The findings issued in 1995 (Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the Army: Technical Report, U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute, June 1995) were quote: