It took our team from March 1991 to June 1991 to collect and prepare 30 U.S. vehicles that were damaged or destroyed during friendly fire incidents involving DU munitions for burial or shipment to a specialized facility in South Carolina for decontamination and disposal. Thousands of other DU contaminated pieces of equipment, bunkers, and terrain were just ignored. The approximate 1 million individual DU rounds and submunitions that were used by United States and British forces were never cleaned up but left where they fell. During January 1993 following analysis of our written reports and personal discussions, scientists and physicians assigned to the United States General Accounting Office issued a report ("Operation Desert Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With Depleted Uranium Contamination", GAO/NSAID-93-90, January 1993, page 7) recommending that the Secretary of the Army quote:
1. ensure that appropriate Army training schools provide adequate information and training to personnel who would come in contact with DU contaminated equipment,
2. develop time frames to implement the proposed DU testing policy involving the testing of all crew members inside vehicles penetrated by DU munitions,
3. expand testing to include personnel involved in the vehicle recovery process should testing of the Army National Guard personnel show that uranium is present in excess of the standards being applied in the medical tests, and
4. develop a formal plan for dealing with the recovery of DU-contaminated equipment.
1. ensure that appropriate Army training schools provide adequate information and training to personnel who would come in contact with DU contaminated equipment,
2. develop time frames to implement the proposed DU testing policy involving the testing of all crew members inside vehicles penetrated by DU munitions,
3. expand testing to include personnel involved in the vehicle recovery process should testing of the Army National Guard personnel show that uranium is present in excess of the standards being applied in the medical tests, and
4. develop a formal plan for dealing with the recovery of DU-contaminated equipment.