Following the May 1999 paper, the March 2001 report Special Operations Technology Objectives provided an overview of the wide range of military technologies required by the Special Forces. This report includes descriptions of many military technologies and reiterates the request for genetically modified anti-material bioweapons and taggant bioweapons. In January 2002, as part of "Scientists Helping America", the Special Forces posted the March 2001 report on the internet and requested US scientists to forward proposals to DARPA. In early 2002 DARPA vetted the ideas and invited the authors of promising proposals to come to Washington and present them to military officials. On 25 January 2002, the Sunshine Project requested these proposals from DARPA under the Freedom of Information Act. DARPA has not responded to the request.
Undermining Biosafety
Preventing genetically engineered disasters is a common concern of arms control and biosafety. The Special Forces propose to covertly introduce difficult to detect genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into third countries. The nascent international safety system for transboundary movement of GMOs (the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol) creates the fundamental requirement of consent. That is, deliberate introduction of GMOs into the environment must have the advanced informed agreement of a competent government agency in the receiving country which reviews the safety and desirability each new introduction on its soil. The Special Forces obviously will not seek permission from a country they are attacking. Moreover, the Special Forces have virtually no knowledge or ability to predict the ecological impacts of use of such environment modifying weapons. As such, the proposed weapons not only pose arms control problems; but are a direct affront to international biosafety efforts.
Undermining Biosafety
Preventing genetically engineered disasters is a common concern of arms control and biosafety. The Special Forces propose to covertly introduce difficult to detect genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into third countries. The nascent international safety system for transboundary movement of GMOs (the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol) creates the fundamental requirement of consent. That is, deliberate introduction of GMOs into the environment must have the advanced informed agreement of a competent government agency in the receiving country which reviews the safety and desirability each new introduction on its soil. The Special Forces obviously will not seek permission from a country they are attacking. Moreover, the Special Forces have virtually no knowledge or ability to predict the ecological impacts of use of such environment modifying weapons. As such, the proposed weapons not only pose arms control problems; but are a direct affront to international biosafety efforts.