A STAGGERING 6000 pages of documents released yesterday afternoon (Saturday) by the Hutton Inquiry include e-mails from Number 10 and briefing papers that confirm Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair’s communications chief, had been actively involved in discussions on the compilation of the Iraq dossier with John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee (JIC). Campbell wrote: “I had many discussions with the chairman of the JIC on presentational issues arising from the dossier and, in common with other officials, made drafting suggestions as the document evolved through various drafts.”
That contradicts the evidence he gave to the inquiry last week, when Campbell had been at pains to play down the role he and other officials played in compiling the dossier, stressing that it was essentially the work of the JIC. He had said that he had “no input, output or influence” on the dossier at any stage and that his own contributions had been “observations” rather than “suggestions” while e-mails from other officials commenting on the dossier had been no more than “office chatter”.
In another note to Blair, he emphasised that the “intelligence judgments” in the dossier were entirely the work of the JIC and that there was “no question of interference with them” by Downing Street. “The allegations that I ‘sexed up’ the document and in so doing abused intelligence is one that I reject entirely, and I have the support of the chairman of the JIC, and the head of the SIS [the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6] in so doing,” he said.
The note is apparently a draft because he adds in parentheses: “John, are you happy with this (and can you check that Richard is)”. John presumably refers to Scarlett while Richard is Sir Richard Dearlove, the chief of SIS.
In an e-mail to Scarlett, dated September 18, 2002 – days before the dossier was published – Campbell appeared to acknowledge the degree of pressure coming from Number 10.
“Sorry to bombard on this point, but I do worry that the nuclear section will become the main focus and as currently drafted is not in great shape,” he said.
An e-mail the following day from the Downing Street chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, expressed concern about the proposed wording of the Prime Minister’s forward to the dossier. “I don’t like the first sentence which makes him sound a bit James Bondy. Can we discuss?” he said.
In a speed-read of the documents published yesterday, the Sunday Herald has also found:
· Downing Street was sent into panic over what Dr David Kelly might tell the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) when he appeared before MPs to answer questions about his con versations with BBC reporters.
· Kelly was “briefed” and “prepared” by government officials and told not to give the FAC his views on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programme.
· A summary of Kelly’s evidence, given in private to the Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, showed that Kelly believed there was only a “30% probability” that the Iraqis had usable weapons.
· Kelly said the claim in the Prime Minister’s September dossier that Saddam could deploy WMD in just 45 minutes was “unwise” and was included for “impact”.
The documents also reveal Campbell urged Tony Blair to be “more combative” in dealing with criticism of the plans for war.
In a lengthy briefing note from Campbell to Blair telling the Prime Minister how to handle critics, Campbell accuses the BBC of trying to “contaminate” Blair’s success as a war leader.
The documents also include a second note from Campbell to the Prime Minister urging Blair to allow him to give evidence to the FAC because of his role in chairing a key committee involved in compiling the government’s dossier on Iraqi weapons.
The first note dated June 3 – five days after the BBC report claiming the Government had “sexed up” its dossier on Iraqi weapons – was intended to prepare Blair for Prime Minister’s Questions and a Commons statement the following day.
In it, Campbell said that the Prime Minister’s aim should be to “calm the frenzy” following the BBC story and rebuild support for the government’s basic position on Iraq.
“A week of denials has not taken us very far forward because the media, particularly the BBC, are trying to create a ‘no smoke without fire’ atmosphere,” he wrote.
“As to the manner in which you deal with it, it must be calm, confident, explanatory and thorough. But when you go on to the broader issues, in particular reporting back on Iraq, I think you should display a more combative approach.”
Campbell warned Blair that he was facing rising opposition to the war on all sides. “What is clearly happening here is that the relatively more sober coverage of the war is giving way to the more usual frenzied media, and the aim of our opponents is to contaminate the success you had as a war leader in Iraq,” he said.
“So those who opposed you then want to justify the opposition then – that goes for some of our MPs, BBC, the left-leaning press. Those who supported you, like the right-wing press, want to look for reasons to regret their support and detach you from Bush.”
In the second note, dated June 22, Campbell spells out to Blair why he should be allowed to give evidence to MPs on the Foreign Affairs Committee because of his “own personal role” in events.
“I believe there are legitimate questions to ask and that I am well placed to answer them, having chaired the Iraqi Communications Group in the run up to conflict,” he said.
The documents also suggest that even as the Ministry of Defence was preparing to confirm Kelly’s name to journalists, there were concerns in Whitehall that he may not have been the source of the BBC story by Today programme journalist Andrew Gilligan.
Powell noted in an e-mail to Scarlett dated July 9: “A source in the BBC has told us that Gilligan’s source is in fact in the Cabinet Office. This might well be a blind. But is there any reason to think there could be any truth in that? Have phone logs been looked at etc?”
Neil Mackay and Stephen Naysmith
neil.mackay@sundayherald.com neil.mackay@sundayherald.com
stephen.naysmith@sundayherald.com
Article republished courtesy of Scotland’s Sunday Herald: http://www.sundayherald.com
For more information, please see:
· The Hutton Inquiry http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/
Please also see:
Headline: Galloway papers deemed forgeries
Byline: Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor
Date: 06/20/2003
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0620/p01s03-woiq.html
That contradicts the evidence he gave to the inquiry last week, when Campbell had been at pains to play down the role he and other officials played in compiling the dossier, stressing that it was essentially the work of the JIC. He had said that he had “no input, output or influence” on the dossier at any stage and that his own contributions had been “observations” rather than “suggestions” while e-mails from other officials commenting on the dossier had been no more than “office chatter”.
In another note to Blair, he emphasised that the “intelligence judgments” in the dossier were entirely the work of the JIC and that there was “no question of interference with them” by Downing Street. “The allegations that I ‘sexed up’ the document and in so doing abused intelligence is one that I reject entirely, and I have the support of the chairman of the JIC, and the head of the SIS [the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6] in so doing,” he said.
The note is apparently a draft because he adds in parentheses: “John, are you happy with this (and can you check that Richard is)”. John presumably refers to Scarlett while Richard is Sir Richard Dearlove, the chief of SIS.
In an e-mail to Scarlett, dated September 18, 2002 – days before the dossier was published – Campbell appeared to acknowledge the degree of pressure coming from Number 10.
“Sorry to bombard on this point, but I do worry that the nuclear section will become the main focus and as currently drafted is not in great shape,” he said.
An e-mail the following day from the Downing Street chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, expressed concern about the proposed wording of the Prime Minister’s forward to the dossier. “I don’t like the first sentence which makes him sound a bit James Bondy. Can we discuss?” he said.
In a speed-read of the documents published yesterday, the Sunday Herald has also found:
· Downing Street was sent into panic over what Dr David Kelly might tell the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) when he appeared before MPs to answer questions about his con versations with BBC reporters.
· Kelly was “briefed” and “prepared” by government officials and told not to give the FAC his views on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programme.
· A summary of Kelly’s evidence, given in private to the Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, showed that Kelly believed there was only a “30% probability” that the Iraqis had usable weapons.
· Kelly said the claim in the Prime Minister’s September dossier that Saddam could deploy WMD in just 45 minutes was “unwise” and was included for “impact”.
The documents also reveal Campbell urged Tony Blair to be “more combative” in dealing with criticism of the plans for war.
In a lengthy briefing note from Campbell to Blair telling the Prime Minister how to handle critics, Campbell accuses the BBC of trying to “contaminate” Blair’s success as a war leader.
The documents also include a second note from Campbell to the Prime Minister urging Blair to allow him to give evidence to the FAC because of his role in chairing a key committee involved in compiling the government’s dossier on Iraqi weapons.
The first note dated June 3 – five days after the BBC report claiming the Government had “sexed up” its dossier on Iraqi weapons – was intended to prepare Blair for Prime Minister’s Questions and a Commons statement the following day.
In it, Campbell said that the Prime Minister’s aim should be to “calm the frenzy” following the BBC story and rebuild support for the government’s basic position on Iraq.
“A week of denials has not taken us very far forward because the media, particularly the BBC, are trying to create a ‘no smoke without fire’ atmosphere,” he wrote.
“As to the manner in which you deal with it, it must be calm, confident, explanatory and thorough. But when you go on to the broader issues, in particular reporting back on Iraq, I think you should display a more combative approach.”
Campbell warned Blair that he was facing rising opposition to the war on all sides. “What is clearly happening here is that the relatively more sober coverage of the war is giving way to the more usual frenzied media, and the aim of our opponents is to contaminate the success you had as a war leader in Iraq,” he said.
“So those who opposed you then want to justify the opposition then – that goes for some of our MPs, BBC, the left-leaning press. Those who supported you, like the right-wing press, want to look for reasons to regret their support and detach you from Bush.”
In the second note, dated June 22, Campbell spells out to Blair why he should be allowed to give evidence to MPs on the Foreign Affairs Committee because of his “own personal role” in events.
“I believe there are legitimate questions to ask and that I am well placed to answer them, having chaired the Iraqi Communications Group in the run up to conflict,” he said.
The documents also suggest that even as the Ministry of Defence was preparing to confirm Kelly’s name to journalists, there were concerns in Whitehall that he may not have been the source of the BBC story by Today programme journalist Andrew Gilligan.
Powell noted in an e-mail to Scarlett dated July 9: “A source in the BBC has told us that Gilligan’s source is in fact in the Cabinet Office. This might well be a blind. But is there any reason to think there could be any truth in that? Have phone logs been looked at etc?”
Neil Mackay and Stephen Naysmith
neil.mackay@sundayherald.com neil.mackay@sundayherald.com
stephen.naysmith@sundayherald.com
Article republished courtesy of Scotland’s Sunday Herald: http://www.sundayherald.com
For more information, please see:
· The Hutton Inquiry http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/
Please also see:
Headline: Galloway papers deemed forgeries
Byline: Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor
Date: 06/20/2003
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0620/p01s03-woiq.html