Hundreds of thousands of U.S. and allied troops entered areas heavily contaminated by DU dust and debris in the Gulf War and at least 11 tons of DU was used by NATO forces in the Balkans. In Afghan cities subjected to allied bombing, uranium concentrations were recorded at 400% to 2000% above normal, with birth defects sharply on the rise.

Stats like these would indicate an urgent push to unravel DU's deadly legacy and prevent further harm; instead, there seems to have been an urgent push to cover up the facts.

In an ominous 1991 memo, U.S. Lt. Col. Ziehmn said that despite concerns over their toxic effects, if DU weapons "proved their worth during our recent combat activities, then we should assure their future existence ... I believe we should keep this sensitive issue at mind when after-action reports are written." This institutionalized denial could explain why governmental studies into the health effects of DU on Gulf war veterans have included flaws and omissions, such as lengthy delays ensuring that many DU acute exposure victims have been dead too long for autopsies to be adequately performed. It may also explain why the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) took a full 18 months after the Balkan conflict to begin investigating post-war uranium contamination and why, even as late as last year, the U.S. and U.K. governments vetoed a proposed World Health Organization (WHO) study into the health effects of DU on Iraqi civilians.